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Introduction 
David Keane and Annapurna Waughray 
  
‘The United Nations exists not merely to preserve the peace but also to make change - even 
radical change – possible’. 
- Ralph Bunche, Nobel Lecture (1950)1 
 
I. The Origins of ICERD 
On 21 December 1965, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD)2 was adopted in the United Nations General Assembly in 
plenary session by 106 votes to none.3 ICERD was the first international human rights treaty, 
and the first major piece of international law in the drafting of which the then newly 
independent States participated and played a leading and decisive role.4 The Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD/ the Committee), established under Article 8 
from 1970 once the treaty had entered into force, was the first international treaty-
monitoring body of its kind.5 The provisions governing its establishment and functions were 
even approved by the Soviet Union and its allies, which had maintained for two decades 
that machinery of this kind infringed national sovereignty and was contrary to the UN 
Charter.6 Banton notes that it was important to call the monitoring body a “committee”, 
which made it sound ‘less novel and less threatening’,7 nomenclature adopted by all 
subsequent UN treaty-monitoring bodies. As observed by the French delegate at the 
conclusion of the drafting process, no treaty of equal scope or significance had ever been 
adopted before.8 
 
From its inception, one of the purposes of the United Nations as articulated in Article 
1(3) of the 1945 UN Charter was to achieve international cooperation in promoting and 
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encouraging respect for human rights for all ‘without distinction as to race’,9 reiterated in 
Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).10 The word “race” had 
not appeared at all in the Covenant of the League of Nations signed in 1919. But the 
language of racism pervaded this first attempt at internationalism nearly a century ago, with 
its mandate system operationalised by the Article 22 ‘sacred trust of civilization’ over 
‘peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern 
world’, with ‘the tutelage of such peoples…entrusted to advanced nations’.11 The UN swept 
away this rhetoric, ‘the explicit endorsement of racial equality in sharp contrast with the 
racial underpinnings of the League system.’12 However the legacy of the League of Nations is 
not entirely absent from the UN system, and the subsequent ICERD regime. The monitoring 
mechanisms that CERD would pioneer for the UN treaty system, in particular state reports 
and a petition process, were core procedures of the League of Nations mandates regime, as 
well as the apparatus of “internationalisation” centred in Geneva with its 
‘interrogations…often with experts briefed by humanitarian lobbies’.13 
 
The UN General Assembly expressed concern about racial discrimination from its 
earliest sessions, often grouped with religious intolerance, declaring in a 1946 resolution 
that it is ‘in the higher interests of humanity to put an immediate end to religious and so-
called racial persecution and discrimination.’14 The movement toward a specific body of 
international rules began as a response to a global outbreak of anti-Semitic incidents that 
took place in the winter of 1959-60, known as the “swastika epidemic”. It resulted in a 
resolution from the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities on ‘manifestations of…religious and racial prejudices’,15 and an instrument was 
proposed in debates that followed. However in 1962, the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly decided to split the issues of racial and religious discrimination, resulting in two 
separate Resolutions calling for the preparation of draft declarations and conventions 
dealing separately with racial discrimination and religious intolerance.16 The rationale was 
driven by political opposition to the inclusion of anti-Semitism as legal recognition of the 
state of Israel,17  although Soviet and Eastern European countries also viewed racial 
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discrimination as being significantly more important than religious intolerance.18 With the 
decision to separate the instruments, it was understood that the draft declaration and 
convention on racial discrimination would receive priority. The 1963 Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which contained eleven articles but no 
definition of “racial discrimination”, was proclaimed on 20 November 1963.19 It was 
followed by the preparation of a Convention of ten articles and a preamble by the Sub-
Commission in January 1964, submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, who adopted 
the substantive articles. This was in turn submitted to the General Assembly in July 1964, 
along with a draft article on implementation and the text of an additional article on anti-
Semitism proposed by the US, and shadowed by a sub-amendment submitted by the 
USSR.20 
 
The proposed article on anti-Semitism did not enjoy broad support in the Third 
Committee. Delegates expressed the view that the Convention should be a timeless one, 
applicable without any qualification to every kind of racial discrimination.21 Most believed 
that it would be inappropriate to single out certain forms of racial discrimination to the 
exclusion of others.22 A proposal by Greece and Hungary to avoid reference to specific forms 
of racial discrimination in the draft Convention was approved by a large majority and the 
proposed article on anti-Semitism was excluded.23 The final text was subsequently adopted 
in December 1965. By contrast the parallel instrument on religious intolerance was never 
achieved, with almost twenty years of debates resulting in a non-binding declaration in 
1981.24  
 
While the impetus for ICERD may lie in anti-Semitism and the swastika epidemic, its 
realisation came from the support of many African and Asian States for what was seen as an 
international statement against apartheid and colonialism.25 This political factor saw a clear 
connection between racism, and apartheid and colonialism, and it is this aspect that 
emerged most forcefully from the 1962 decision to split the issues of racial discrimination 
and religious intolerance. The text of the treaty itself reflects this, and despite the decision 
taken in the Third Committee not to include in the ICERD any reference to specific forms of 
racial discrimination, it retained a specific reference to apartheid in Article 3 on the basis 
that: ‘it differed from other forms in that it was the official policy of a State Member of the 
United Nations.’26 In relation to colonialism, the right of petition was considered an 
important device in the international trusteeship system and its decolonization procedures, 
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leading to the inclusion of Article 15 ICERD dealing with petitions from the inhabitants of 
Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories and all other territories to which the 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies.27 
While today Article 15 has lost most of its significance since only a few non-self-governing 
territories are left, ICERD as a statement against colonialism is still considered the ‘logical 
place’ for this right of petition.28 The Preamble to the treaty reads as a combined statement 
against apartheid and colonialism in its articulation that ‘the United Nations has condemned 
colonialism and all practices of segregation’, as well as ‘governmental policies based on 
racial superiority or hatred, such as policies of apartheid’.  
 
Apartheid and colonialism were not the only forces influencing the treaty’s drafting. 
For example, Lovelace Jr. investigates the 14-member UN Sub-Commission’s January 1964 
visit to Atlanta, Georgia, in the United States, suggested by the US member Morris Abram in 
part in order to persuade the drafters that the city’s transition away from Jim Crow laws was 
possible under a juridical framework which protected the freedom of speech of hate groups 
as well as civil rights organisations.29 In documenting the visit through a range of sources 
including local media, and charting the impact of demonstrations by the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee among other civil rights groups on the Sub-Commission members, 
Lovelace Jr. argues persuasively that historians of ICERD need to employ a more diverse 
range of primary and secondary sources to reconstruct the treaty’s rich drafting history.30 
Additionally the Atlanta experience should have underlined for the Sub-Commission ‘the 
importance of expanding the formal drafting process to include more critical, non-state 
actors of color…in understanding how law might be used in diverse areas of the world to 
end manifestations of racial discrimination.’31 This did not occur; Lovelace Jr. points out that 
the Sub-Commission ‘experts’ were an all-male body largely representative of the global 
North, with half of its composition from Europe alone and its agenda dictated by state 
actors or elite NGOs.32 For example, despite its pre-occupation with apartheid, ‘the Sub-
Commission failed to invite any South African freedom fighters to inform and enrich its 
discussions of the proposed Convention’.33 Hence the influence of the global South or black 
internationalism on the treaty can only be traced by moving beyond the dominant 
methodological approach of tracking Convention debates in various UN organs, represented 
in ‘internalist’ accounts of the treaty’s origins.34 
 
In the UN General Assembly, the early perception of ICERD as a cornerstone in the 
anti-apartheid and anti-colonial struggle led the representative of Ghana, the first former 
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British colony in Africa to achieve independence, to comment following the vote to approve 
the treaty: ‘this was its finest hour’.35 The momentum that turned a resolution on anti-
Semitism in 1960 into a binding instrument on racial discrimination in 1965 was driven by 
the belief that it was a statement to put an immediate end to apartheid, colonialism, and 
more generally discrimination against “black” and other “non-white” persons.36 The initial 
and to some extent continuing task of CERD would be to convince States parties that the 
treaty was not only a condemnation of these practices but applied equally to all States 
parties in their internal affairs, as well as to forms of racial discrimination that were not 
necessarily based on paradigmatic skin colour prejudices and its manifestations. 
 
To date, the Convention has been ratified by 177 States parties,37 with a further 6 
States signatories. Just 14 States have failed to engage with the treaty - Brunei Darussalam, 
the Democratic People’s Republic of [“North”] Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, and South Sudan, 
plus eight Pacific Island Countries, and the Caribbean island of Dominica.38 Of these, the 
only State that has not signed or ratified ICERD to some extent attributable to a lack of 
capacity due to size or geography, an isolationist civil and political climate hostile to 
international engagement, or relative youth, is Malaysia. Indeed, a call from the Human 
Rights Commission of Malaysia to ratify the instrument highlights how ICERD is ‘nearing 
universal acceptance’.39 Thus the first achievement of ICERD in its 50 years must be its 
current ‘near universal’ status in terms of States parties, covering approximately 95 percent 
of the world’s population. As described by CERD, it represents: ‘the international 
community’s only tool for combating racial discrimination which is at one and the same time 
universal in reach, comprehensive in scope, legally binding in character, and equipped with 
built-in measures of implementation.’40  
 
II. ICERD and CERD 
 
ICERD is a concise instrument by contemporary standards with a relatively small number of 
operative provisions. Meron highlights deficiencies in the drafting, noting that ‘[t]he speed 
with which the Convention was considered and adopted, the robustness of the political 
forces that pushed its formulation and adoption, and perhaps a certain impatience with the 
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niceties of legal drafting are among the factors that underlie some of the problems.’41 Yet, 
while in parts a flawed text, it has proven remarkably effective in realising a shift from a 
narrow understanding of its scope to a much wider reach and relevance. In the early days, 
many States simply emphatically denied that any form of racial discrimination existed in 
their territories.42 Of the first 45 state party reports, only five States admitted there was any 
racial discrimination occurring, with two of these explaining it was being practised by 
another state.43 It was also common for States to refer to racial discrimination only as part 
of their inheritance from the colonial era. CERD issued General Recommendation (GR) 2 in 
1972 as a response to the ‘express or implied’ belief from States that ‘racial discrimination 
does not exist’ on their territories, requiring all States parties to submit reports on the 
measures adopted that give effect to the provisions of the Convention.44 The fulcrum in 
counteracting this outlook and opening up the treaty to a wide range of groups is the 
definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in Article 1(1), as:  
 
‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, 
or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural and any other field 
of public life.’ 
 
The five grounds, ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’, serve to distinguish 
“race” from the broader concept of “racial discrimination”. Furthermore the treaty makes 
no comment on the meaning of “race” itself, an exercise that UNESCO attempted in a series 
of ultimately contradictory statements on race from 1950-67.45 Instead, ICERD contains a 
legal definition of racial discrimination that does not further define its constituent elements. 
As Thornberry notes:  
 
‘it is an obvious point – but easily missed – that the umbrella term for the 
Convention is ‘racial discrimination’, not race. Thus, racial discrimination is given a 
stipulative meaning by the Convention: as precisely the five terms set out in Article 
1, which means “race” but four other terms as well. It is thus clear that the scope of 
the Convention is broader than…notions of race, which in any case may express 
many usages.’46 
 
The five terms are a closed group, with no indicative phrase (e.g. “such as”) preceding their 
enumeration. Thus in principle any group that falls under the aegis of the treaty must come 
under one (or a combination) of the five grounds, although the practice of the Committee is 
not necessarily to articulate which one. For example its GR 27 on the Roma does not specify 
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where this group fits in the definition of Article 1(1).47 In a contemporary setting, certain 
groups, such as indigenous peoples,48 non-citizens including migrants and refugees,49 
minorities,50 or caste groups,51 none of which may appear obviously to fall under an existing 
ground or grounds, have been interpreted as coming under the ‘umbrella term’ of racial 
discrimination. The Committee will at times pinpoint exactly where they fall, as it did in 
relation to caste groups and the third ground “descent”,52 but generally prefers simply to 
treat them as coming within the purview of the treaty without specifying exactly where. The 
principle of self-identification, expressed in GR 8, means that membership of a particular 
group for the purposes of Article 1(1) ‘shall, if no justification exists to the contrary, be 
based upon self-identification’,53 leaving the question to the individual or group themselves 
(with an option of contestation by the State party concerned, the ‘justification…to the 
contrary’).  
The difficulty with this approach is that for certain groups it may not be clear 
whether they do come under the treaty, for example religious groups;54 while for others, 
States parties may oppose their inclusion via CERD interpretation, such as India in relation to 
caste groups, or Ireland in relation to Travellers.55 While there are examples of conflicting 
views, for the most part States parties do not contest the treaty body’s understanding of 
which groups form part of their reporting remit. The definition of racial discrimination in 
Article 1 has been instrumental in furthering the object and purpose of the treaty, namely 
the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, and its adaptability has been a key 
aspect in ensuring that ICERD is a “living instrument” continually identifying groups 
previously excluded, marginalised, or insufficiently protected within the international 
system.  
 
While the text of the treaty remains static (with no additions via protocols), CERD 
has been the vehicle for evolution in terms of procedural innovations and interpretation of 
key terms. Initially from 1970, there was a heavy representation of diplomats on CERD. This 
                                                     
47
 CERD, ‘General Recommendation 27 on Discrimination against Roma’, UN Doc. A/55/18, annex V at 154 
(2000). 
48
 CERD, ‘General Recommendation 23 on Rights of indigenous peoples’, UN Doc. A/52/18, Annex V at 122 
(1997). See also Patrick Thornberry, ‘The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, indigenous 
peoples, and caste/descent-based discrimination’. 
49
 CERD, ‘General Recommendation 30 on Discrimination against Non-citizens’, UN Doc. 
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004). 
50
 There is no CERD GR on minorities, but for an analysis of the many minority rights aspects to CERD’s work, 
see David Keane and Joshua Castellino, ‘Is ICERD the de facto minority rights treaty?’ in C. Buckley, A. Donald 
and P. Leach (eds.), Towards Convergence in International Human Rights Law: Approaches of Regional and 
International Systems (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2016, forthcoming). 
51
 CERD, ‘General Recommendation 29 on Discrimination based on descent’, UN Doc. A/57/18 at 111 (2002). 
See also David Keane, Caste-based Discrimination in International Human Rights Law (Surrey: Ashgate, 2007), 
and Annapurna Waughray, Capturing Caste in Law: The Legal Regulation of Caste Discrimination (Routledge 
Research in Human Rights Law, 2017, forthcoming). 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 CERD, ‘General Recommendation 8 on Membership of racial or ethnic groups based on self-identification’, 
UN Doc. A/45/18 at 79 (1991). 
54
 See further Jose A. Lindgren Alves, ‘Race and religion in the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination’, University of San Francisco Law Review, 42 (2007-2008), 941-82. 
55
 For an account of Ireland’s refusal to recognise Irish Travellers as an ethnic group for the purposes of ICERD, 
see Robbie McVeigh, ‘“Ethnicity denial”’ and racism: The case of the Government of Ireland against Irish 
Travellers’, Translocations, 2:1 (2007), 90-133. 
assisted in gaining support for the novelty of the state reporting process including 
examination of reports, but created an environment whereby Committee membership was 
seen ‘as simply one diplomatic duty among others’. 56  The Cold War impeded the 
Committee’s work in the 1980s, but after the Committee elections in 1988 the atmosphere 
began to change and ‘[m]embers could trust one another more’.57 From the late 1980s 
States parties began to see treaty-body membership as calling for persons independent 
from governments, and the Committee started to succeed in improving many of its 
procedures. It is also apparent that the Committee benefited from more legal expertise 
among its membership. The examination of States’ reports became more searching, with 
major advances including the appointment of country rapporteurs, and the issuing of a 
collective view on a report instead of a summary of what different members had said, which 
would become known as Concluding Observations (COs).58  
 
From 1991, CERD formally decided that while the base for its examination was state 
reports, members must have access as independent experts to all other available sources of 
information, including non-governmental sources. CERD also decided it would review 
implementation of the treaty in the absence of a state report where that report was 
overdue by five years or more, later extended to a five year absence or more of an initial 
report, enabling the Committee to ‘take charge of the reporting process instead of simply 
reacting to incoming reports’.59 From 1992, it evolved new Early Warning and Urgent Action 
procedures for more critical instances or patterns of discrimination with the potential for 
widespread and systematic violations or targeting of groups .60 New follow-up procedures 
from 2005 saw the appointment of rapporteurs for the purpose of ascertaining measures 
taken by States parties to give effect to the Committee’s suggestions and 
recommendations. 61  Under Article 9(2), CERD may ‘make suggestions and general 
recommendations based on the examination of the reports’, a phrase that authorises both 
the COs and GRs of today and additional to the main dialogues, CERD general 
recommendations now number 35. These ‘cover a wide area of practical, exegetical and 
group-oriented themes, integrated into the work of the Committee as it interfaces with 
States Parties.’62  
 
Alston, in tracing the history of general recommendations/comments, highlights how 
they have evolved from a concept of unclear and contested meaning to a tool of 
fundamental importance in the armoury of international human rights law.63 CERD was the 
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first treaty body to issue GRs, from 1972. These were initially focussed on treaty provisions 
and more technical reporting requirements, but have more recently facilitated the 
Committee in turning its attention to groups that had received a low priority within the 
structures of the UN, or were suffering continued marginalisation, such as indigenous 
peoples, the Roma, caste/descent-based groups, migrants, refugees and other non-citizens, 
and people of African descent, all of whom have been the subject of a GR. The gender-based 
dimensions of all aspects of the Committee’s work were recognised in GR 25, marking a 
more systematic and consistent approach in this cross-cutting area.64 The practice of holding 
‘thematic discussions’ to inform GRs began in relation to GR 27 and the Roma in 2000, and 
continued in GR 29 and caste/descent in 2002, and GR 34 and people of African descent in 
2011.65 It moved away from its group focus in relation to the most recent thematic 
discussion held on combatting racist hate speech, resulting in GR 35 in 2013.66  
 
The communications procedure contained in Article 14 has been operative since 
1984 but attracted few cases in its first years. It has potential for more significant impact as 
more States parties accept the Committee’s competence to receive such communications - 
currently numbering 54 - and the procedure becomes better known. Van Boven, writing in 
2000, found that ‘Article 14 did more to serve as a break-through and a precedent in 
connection with other international legal instruments than as an international recourse 
procedure for victims of racial discrimination’.67 In other words its principal impact was in 
opening the way to more successful communication procedures for other UN treaty bodies. 
Since then, the increased number of declarations and resulting communications or “cases” 
may be changing the overall perception of its efficacy. It has unique features, including the 
fact that Article 14 explicitly provides for the possibility that groups as well as individuals 
may initiate a procedure alleging a violation of any of the rights of the Convention.68 A 
second distinct aspect is that CERD is not prevented from considering communications that 
are being or have been examined under another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement. It is apparent that more analysis is needed on the communications procedure as 
it grows in importance, although the OHCHR recently published a first volume of ‘selected 
decisions’ of the Committee, presenting 32 of the most significant decisions on admissibility 
and merits.69 The inter-state procedure that can be triggered under Article 11 has not been 
effectively used, in common with other treaties. There have been a number of what 
Buergenthal terms ‘disguised inter-state disputes’, in which States complain about other 
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States in their reports under Article 9, but decline to formally access the Article 11 inter-
State complaints procedure.70  
 
CERD for the most part focuses on building a “dialogue” with States parties over 
reporting cycles that have a range of technical requirements. The obligations in the 
Convention are found in general in Article 2(1), and in more detail in Articles 3 to 7, and the 
reporting state must detail how it is implementing these provisions. The process is premised 
on the need for the state party to identify through disaggregated data who the groups are 
on its territory that fall under the purview of the Convention definition and their position in 
relation to the enjoyment of the full range of rights. Each dialogue is followed by a set of 
COs by the Committee that contain elements of praise, statements of concern and 
recommendations for further action.71 These will be informed and supported by reference 
to relevant GRs which lend authority to Committee pronouncements and guide States in the 
implementation of the relatively terse COs.  
 
Although a 1960s document, ICERD did not suffer the Cold War bifurcation between 
civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights, with its Article 5 containing a 
non-exhaustive list of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights comparable in its 
scope to the “International Bill of Human Rights”.72 The equal status of economic, social and 
cultural rights is explained by the fact that the obligations of the States parties do not refer 
to the granting of these rights, but only to admitting no racial discrimination in their 
enjoyment to the extent that they were guaranteed in the domestic law of the States 
parties.73 If the elimination of racial discrimination is generally viewed as a civil and political 
right, which it almost certainly was at the time, the economic, social and cultural rights 
recognised in the treaty provisions are granted only in the furtherance of that object and 
purpose. Nevertheless ICERD is the first international treaty not to separate these 
“generations” of rights. In GR 20, CERD noted that Article 5 ‘assumes the existence and 
recognition of these rights’, and in addition to its civil and political emphases,74 it has more 
recently advanced the understanding of the elimination of racial discrimination in the 
economic, social and cultural spheres. Prouvez highlights how under Article 5 ‘the equal 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights has been a matter of continuing and major 
concern for the Committee’, including labour, housing, health, education, land, language 
and culture rights, with the ‘deplorable socio-economic situation in which many members of 
these vulnerable groups live’, together with the lack of effective remedies for violations of 
these rights, ‘relentlessly stressed by the Committee’.75  
 
Overall the priority for CERD in eliminating racial discrimination in the enjoyment of 
the full range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, is to devise new ways to 
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ensure recommendations have a practical impact, meaning recommendations are 
increasingly concrete and specific with established procedures for follow-up that require 
reports on implementation.76 This is allied with the Article 6 direction to assure ‘effective 
protection and remedies’, supported by GR 26.77 Furthermore GR 32 has set out the 
meaning and scope of special measures under the treaty, governed by Articles 1(4) and 
2(2).78 It emphasises that special measures for the purposes of ICERD has an ‘autonomous 
meaning’ to be interpreted in the light of the Convention as a whole, which may differ from 
domestic usage of the concept in particular States parties.79   
 
Understanding CERD’s impact to a given situation or group requires close 
examination of the dialogue process with an individual state party. In effect, the “dialogue” 
that CERD advocates is a misnomer, since Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and civil 
society have become a key third party in its efficacy, with further input and participation 
from other international bodies and experts in line with wider UN mainstreaming and 
collaboration. Particularly since the turn of the new millennium, CERD has understood that 
‘examination necessitates an active civil society input in order to make a reality of the 
notion of a “constructive” dialogue: otherwise the “dialogue” could be reduced to a mere 
page-turning exercise.’80 The idea is to ‘encourage civil society to activate this important 
safety valve for victims of racial discrimination.’81 In practice it means that all sources of 
information, including civil society information, are critically and professionally appraised by 
the Committee before the adoption of COs. In addition to the larger or international NGOs, 
small or grassroots organisations are encouraged and have made a visible contribution to 
the Committee’s work, bringing the treaty closer to local activists and issues. Drawing 
increased NGO participation into the Committee’s work is reflective of the enlargement of 
CERD’s concerns since its inception in the 1970s, notably in the recognition of new 
categories of rights-holders, and it has in turn ‘served to provide a legal cutting edge to 
defend their rights.’82  
 
III. A Living Instrument 
 
The notion of an evolutionary or dynamic interpretation of treaties has been applied in 
international jurisprudence predating the UN human rights system,83 but regional and 
international human rights bodies have formulated this idea through the concept of the 
human rights treaty as a “living instrument”. The origin of the phrase is commonly 
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cites the Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims arbitral decision from 1925 as one example of evolutionary treaty 
interpretation outside of, and indeed predating, the international human rights law realm. 
attributed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which held in Tyrer v. United 
Kingdom (1978) that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a ‘living 
instrument…[to be] interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.84 Bjorge believes that 
the phrase was coined by Judge Max Sorenson, in a 1975 report,85 three years before the 
ECtHR first employed it in Tyrer.86 The concept has been criticised particularly in an ECtHR 
context, seen in a dissenting opinion in the original Tyrer decision up to current accusations 
of excessive judicial activism or creativity, inconsistent with established principles of treaty 
interpretation.87  
 
Nicolas Bratza, the former President of the ECtHR, observes that Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties88 requires that treaties be interpreted in good 
faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms, but that those 
terms are also required to be read ‘in their context’ which includes the Preamble, and in the 
light of the treaty’s ‘object and purpose’. This requires making safeguards practical and 
effective and of continuing relevance, which led the ECtHR ‘to adopt an evolutive and 
purposive approach to the interpretation of the Convention and thereby breathe life into 
the words of the instrument so as to make it relevant to contemporary European society.’89 
This is balanced by ensuring that ‘the application of the “living instrument” doctrine is 
confined within reasonable bounds’, 90  leading to his characterisation of the Court’s 
approach as ‘incremental and evolutionary, rather than revolutionary’.91 Letsas similarly 
understands evolutionary interpretation under the ECtHR as ‘a process of moral discovery’, 
where ‘the Court is not expanding or inflating the scope of the ECHR rights by treating the 
Convention as a living instrument; rather it discovers what these human rights always meant 
to protect.’92 
 
In the regional systems outside Europe, the doctrine has been invoked by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in a number of decisions, such as The Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (2001) which held that: ‘human rights treaties are live 
instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the times and, specifically, 
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to current living conditions’.93 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
recently adopted the living instrument approach to interpret the term ‘peoples’ in the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights to include indigenous peoples, in Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council) v. Kenya (2009).94  
 
Internationally, Schlutter notes that the principle of what she terms ‘dynamic 
interpretation’ has been adopted by all of the UN treaty bodies.95 For example, in Judge v 
Canada (2003) the Human Rights Committee noted in relation to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: ‘the Covenant should be interpreted as a living instrument and 
the rights protected under it should be applied in context and in the light of present–day 
conditions.’ 96  In V.X.N. and H.N. v Sweden (2000), the Committee Against Torture 
considered that the Convention Against Torture ‘as a living instrument, must be interpreted 
and applied taking into account the circumstances of contemporary society.’ 97  The 
Chairperson of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) has written that: ‘CEDAW has ensured that the Convention is a living instrument 
both in substance and procedures’,98 while CEDAW’s GR 25 on special measures states: 
‘[t]he Convention is a dynamic instrument’.99 The Committee on the Rights of the Child 
captures the pan-treaty character of the living instrument doctrine in its General Comment 
8, which highlights: ‘the Convention, like all human rights instruments, must be regarded as 
a living instrument, whose interpretation develops over time.’100  
 
The confluence of the adoption of the living instrument doctrine in regional and 
international human rights treaties is a result of the special character of human rights 
instruments, designed to protect the rights of individuals within States parties rather than to 
create reciprocal rights for the States parties themselves.101 While the UN treaty bodies 
have expressed their common adherence to this approach, their activation of the doctrine 
may differ, broadly as a feature of the contrast between the international and regional 
systems, and more specifically between individual treaty bodies.  
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Broadly, a clear differentiating feature between the international and regional 
human rights systems is the preponderance of caselaw within the regional systems. Since 
the living instrument doctrine has its origins in the judge-made caselaw of the regional 
systems, specifically Europe, this has been initially mirrored by the international 
mechanisms in articulating the living instrument doctrine in individual communications. 
However within international human rights treaty law, the state reporting procedure rather 
than individual communications is the heart of the monitoring process, and the general 
recommendations/comments form the doctrinal basis for the state reporting system. Hence 
it is the concluding observations and general recommendations/comments that better 
reflect the emergence and practice of the living instrument doctrine within international 
human rights law. Specifically, certain treaty bodies may point more readily to the individual 
communications procedure as an expression of the living instrument doctrine, in particular 
the Human Rights Committee with its advanced and substantive jurisprudence.102 But in 
general for the treaty bodies, the optional character of individual communications means 
they are not recognised by the majority of States parties, and have a distinctly lesser 
relevance compared to the state reporting procedure. Hence an idea that has become as 
central to the treaty bodies’ work as the living instrument doctrine should not be located 
primarily within an under-representative individual communications procedure. 
 
In relation to CERD, the living instrument doctrine has been expressly invoked in an 
individual communication, Hagan v Australia (2003), in which the Committee noted that: 
‘the Convention, as a living instrument, must be interpreted and applied taking into 
[account] the circumstances of contemporary society.’103 This echoes the origins of the living 
instrument doctrine in regional human rights caselaw, and the communication is cited by 
commentators as the “source” or authority for the living instrument doctrine in ICERD.104 
The facts in Hagan relate to a sports stand in Australia, named in the 1960s after a sports 
personality whose nickname was a racial epithet (although he was neither black nor of 
aboriginal descent), which the petitioner as an aborigine found objectionable and offensive. 
The Committee did not find a violation of the treaty, but instead recommended that the 
offending term be removed from the sign, on the basis that in contemporary society the 
term was offensive:  
 
‘[T]he Committee considers that that use and maintenance of the offending term 
can at the present time be considered offensive and insulting, even if for an 
extended period it may not have necessarily been so regarded. The Committee 
considers, in fact, that the Convention, as a living instrument, must be interpreted 
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and applied taking into [account] the circumstances of contemporary society. In this 
context, the Committee considers it to be its duty to recall the increased sensitivities 
in respect of words such as the offending term appertaining today.’105  
 
This opinion appears to be a misreading of the meaning of the Convention as a living 
instrument. The decision is not about a term, phrase or provision in the Convention itself; it 
is about a racial epithet, whose supposed offensiveness may have changed over time. 
Additionally the term itself was clearly racist and offensive in the 1960s as well as today and 
it seems strange that the Committee required invoking the living instrument doctrine to 
justify a contemporary recommendation to have it removed.106 The doctrine is not about 
external words that may change over time, but rather the terms or provisions of the 
instruments themselves that may evolve and find new applications. Nowhere in Hagan is 
there a point about ICERD terms or provisions changing over time, requiring dynamic or 
evolutive intepretation to render them applicable to the contemporary circumstances in the 
communication.  
 
The idea of a living instrument has its origins in regional human rights caselaw and so 
it may seem logical to locate the idea in international human rights law in individual 
communications, but these may not be reflective of the evolutive approach to international 
treaty interpretation. More generally in relation to international human rights treaties, and 
certainly specifically in relation to ICERD, it is the concluding observations and general 
recommendations, rather than the individual communications, that better capture the idea 
of the treaties as living instruments. While the concluding observations are State-specific, 
the general recommendations provide a treaty-wide and pan-state party overview of its 
operation and effects and are key to understanding CERD’s practice of the living instrument 
doctrine. CERD has ‘shown over time its ability to adapt to and address issues and actors 
relevant to the contemporary global context’,107 and this may be briefly illustrated by 
looking at three general recommendations: GR 19 on apartheid; GR 29 on descent; and GR 
30 on non-citizens. These evoke different facets of the living instrument doctrine in CERD’s 
workings, through what may be termed affirmative, purposive, and contextual readings of 
ICERD provisions. 
 
Under Article 3 ICERD, ‘States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and 
apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in 
territories under their jurisdiction.’ GR 19 on Article 3 reads: ‘The reference to apartheid 
may have been directed exclusively to South Africa, but the article as adopted prohibits all 
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forms of racial segregation in all countries.’108 Issued in 1995, it may be read as a reaction to 
the ending of apartheid in South Africa and a re-interpretation of Article 3, with its primary 
purpose now achieved, as being of relevance to other situations of racial segregation 
engaging all States parties. The acknowledgement of the narrow drafting intention behind 
Article 3 is juxtaposed with an interpretive statement that the Committee intends to apply 
the provisions beyond the parameters of (now defunct) apartheid South Africa. Yet GR 19 
does nothing new to the words of Article 3; it simply restates them. This is present in the 
phrase ‘as adopted’, in other words, that an ordinary reading of Article 3 ‘as adopted’ clearly 
indicates that it is a provision that applies to all States parties engaging in practices of this 
nature. While there may be debate as to whether apartheid is a term of relevance outside 
South Africa, there can be no disagreement that situations of racial segregation can be 
global. Nowhere in Article 3 are the words “South Africa” found, and it involves the 
composite term ‘racial segregation and apartheid’, hence GR 19 is not so much an 
interpretation as an affirmation that a sui generis South African interpretation of the 
meaning of Article 3 is too narrow and not in line with the text itself. This is one expression 
of the living instrument doctrine; an affirmation of existing terms in reaction to 
contemporary events or as a statement of renewed Committee intent on a provision. 
 
GR 29 on discrimination based on descent takes a term that did not have any clear 
meaning at the drafting stage and imbues it with a purpose. Its preamble reads that 
“descent” includes discrimination against members of communities based on forms of social 
stratification such as caste and analogous systems of inherited status, thus locating the issue 
of caste and analogous systems under the rubric of descent-based discrimination. The 
preamble to GR 29 references the state reporting process, ‘[n]oting that the existence of 
such discrimination has become evident from the Committee’s examination of reports of a 
number of States parties to the Convention’. In this way the challenge faced by the 
Committee – where to fit caste and analogous systems within the closed definitional 
grounds in Article 1(1) – is resolved by locating it within the wider and relatively open 
category of descent. The term “descent” was largely dormant up until this point and thus GR 
29 is a reflection of a purposive living instrument doctrine whose task it is, to quote the 
ECtHR in Tyrer, to ‘breathe life into the words of the instrument’. 
 
GR 30 on non-citizens has been referenced in a UN Special Representative report as 
a specific example under the heading ‘CERD as a Living Instrument’:  
 
‘CERD considers it crucial to reflect the actual development of international 
standards in its interpretation of the Convention, as reflected also by General 
Recommendation 30 regarding non-citizens. By outlining a wide range of obligations 
that States have in relation to non-citizens, General Recommendation 30 arguably 
transcends to a significant extent the limitations contained in Article 1(2).’109  
 
The quote reflects the problem that Article 1(2) ICERD appears to specifically exclude non-
citizens from the ambit of the treaty. It reads: ‘This Convention shall not apply to 
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distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention 
between citizens and non-citizens.’ GR 30 notes in its preamble that it has become evident 
from the examination of the reports of States parties to the Convention that groups, 
including migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, and undocumented non-citizens, ‘constitutes 
one of the main sources of contemporary racism and that human rights violations against 
members of such groups occur widely’, and as a result:  
 
‘Article 1, paragraph 2, must be construed so as to avoid undermining the basic 
prohibition of discrimination; hence, it should not be interpreted to detract in any 
way from the rights and freedoms recognized and enunciated in particular in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’.110 
 
Thus GR 30 is not so much an interpretation as a re-reading of one its provisions, Article 
1(2), by reference to the full range of provisions in ICERD and the wider international legal 
context. It is triggered by reference to information from States parties through the reporting 
procedure that non-citizens such as the undocumented are clearly a group of concern, with 
the wider justification of the growing recognition of their rights under the “International Bill 
of Rights”. GR 30 does not employ the phrase “living instrument”, but it is a clear reflection 
of the doctrine in the sense of adopting an evolutive approach to the treaty’s provisions 
congruent to the context of related provisions within the treaty, and the wider recognition 
of non-citizens’ rights in international human rights law. It affirms that no provision of ICERD 
can be viewed in isolation.  
 
In fact none of GR 19, GR 29 or GR 30 employ the phrase “living instrument”, 
although all can be seen as reflecting different expressions of CERD’s employment of the 
doctrine, triggered or justified by information gathered in the state reporting process. Later 
general recommendations have made such an express reference to the doctrine. Thus GR 32 
on special measures reads: 
 
‘The Convention, as the Committee has observed on many occasions, is a living 
instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking into account the 
circumstances of contemporary society. This approach makes it imperative to read 
its text in a context-sensitive manner. The context…includes, in addition to the full 
text of the Convention including its title, preamble and operative articles, the range 
of universal human rights standards on the principles of non-discrimination and 
special measures. Context-sensitive interpretation also includes taking into account 
the particular circumstances of States parties without prejudice to the universal 
quality of the norms of the Convention. The nature of the Convention and the broad 
scope of its provisions imply that, while the conscientious application of Convention 
principles will produce variations in outcome among States parties, such variations 
must be fully justifiable in the light of the principles of the Convention.’111 
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The passage underlines the idea that ICERD as a “living instrument” permeates the 
Committee’s current thinking and is finding more overt expression. Of the different 
approaches outlined above, the first two, the affirmative and purposive, can be seen as 
early incarnations of the doctrine, with the contextual approach, implicit in GR 30 and 
articulated expressly in GR 32, capturing the particular CERD living instrument identity. The 
‘[c]ontext-sensitive interpretation’ of GR 32 situates CERD’s dialogue with States parties 
within: (i) the full text of the Convention, including its title, preamble and operative articles; 
(ii) wider international human rights law standards, both treaty-based and Charter-based; 
and (iii) the changing history, politics and experience of the State itself in terms of its 
Convention groups. The living instrument doctrine also serves to bring the treaty closer to 
the victims of all forms of racial discrimination, in particular as represented by NGOs. This 
link is emphasised in the most recent GR 35 (2013): ‘By virtue of its work in implementing 
the Convention as a living instrument, the Committee engages with the wider human rights 
environment, awareness of which suffuses the Convention.’112 
 
Nathalie Prouvez, former Secretary of CERD, notes: ‘the Committee views the 
Convention as a living instrument’, and continues: ‘The general approach of the Committee 
to the interpretation of the Convention has been increasingly creative, as can be seen 
through the…General Recommendations’. 113  She highlights how the Committee also 
provides its interpretation of the Convention in the COs, as well as early warning and urgent 
action procedures, and individual communications,114 and all of these reflect the workings 
of the doctrine. ICERD is a living instrument in the combination of its mechanisms and work, 
but this ‘creative’ aspect is perhaps best captured ‘[t]hrough its General Recommendations 
and Concluding Observations, [where] CERD has elaborated upon the scope of protection of 
the Convention and demonstrated its continuing relevance and application to contemporary 
forms of racism suffered by specific groups.’115 It is also reflected in the autonomous 
meaning and nature of the special measures recommended by CERD. 
 
Through its interpretive approach, CERD, in the past 50 years, has become a node 
within the UN for minorities, indigenous peoples, and many other groups including those 
who were previously not covered by any understanding. It is not the only source of regional 
and international rights for these groups, but it offers a coherent “umbrella” to advance the 
dialogue between these groups and States parties. It views NGOs and civil society, small and 
large, as essential to this process. The idea of ICERD as a living instrument drives its 
evolution. The doctrine was specifically highlighted in the short document marking the 
treaty’s 50th anniversary: ‘Indeed, even after half a decade since its adoption, ICERD 
continues to remain relevant to the issues that we face today … The Convention, as a living 
instrument, must be interpreted and applied taking into account the circumstances of 
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contemporary society.’116 Although certain aspects of a particular CERD understanding of 
the living instrument doctrine can now be discerned, it continues to evolve. 
 
IV. Chapters Summary 
 
Thornberry observes: ‘There is perhaps less written about ICERD than about other ‘core’ UN 
human rights conventions.’117 This was acknowledged in presentations at the event held in 
Geneva in November 2015 to mark the 50th anniversary, in which Gay McDougall, a former 
CERD member re-taking a place on the Committee in 2016, stated that CERD needs to be 
more visible, and speak loudly in corridors where it has not had its voice heard sufficiently 
thus far. She referred to the need to influence decision-making on development, poverty, 
and peace and security, and having a voice in New York as well as in Geneva. Through the 
living instrument doctrine, the instrument has achieved great relevance to a range of groups 
and this needs to be better communicated. In this vein the current collection seeks to make 
a contribution to this process in terms of providing a range of contributors and themes, 
combining current and former CERD members with academics and commentators to 
provide an overview of the treaty and its contemporary meaning and importance. 
 
Part I ICERD: Cross-cutting Themes 
 
Chapter 1, Michael Banton, ‘Extending the Rule of Law’, opens the collection with a tour 
d’horizon of the origins, lifetime and experience of implementing the treaty from the 
perspective of a CERD member. It argues that the treaty ought to be considered a significant 
step forward in the extension of the rule of law. The innovations that have been realised by 
CERD are recognised, documented and placed in their historical and legal contexts, with 
assessments as to their efficacy. Practical impediments to the realisation of the treaty’s 
aims, both past and present, inform the discussion, such as past state evasions in budgetary 
responsibilities. The character of the dialogue that is central to CERD’s operations, and the 
factors around its emergence and influence on the wider treaty body system, are explored. 
This chapter, with its birds-eye view of CERD both in terms of its legal meaning and scope, 
and history of operation in time, as well as appreciation of the nuance and practicalities of 
realising its object and purpose, will serve to bring much needed illumination to the study of 
CERD and the wider UN treaty bodies. It provides an essential keynote to the collection. 
 
Chapter 2, Joshua Clark, ‘Knowing and Doing with Numbers: Disaggregated Data in 
the Work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’, is a lynchpin of the 
collection and a crucial contribution to the understanding of ICERD on its 50th anniversary. 
Through the issue of disaggregated data collection, Clark tracks the changes in CERD’s 
approach from its early days to contemporary questions, capturing shifts in the Committee’s 
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priorities and engagement with States parties. The focus is on the centrality of data to 
CERD’s task in eliminating racial discrimination, but the history of the treaty is also 
highlighted through this question. At present CERD receives disaggregated data from the 
vast majority of States, linked to the key concept of special measures, with few exempted 
from this obligation. However some Committee members’ apprehension ensures that CERD 
does not automatically press for ethno-racial data from every reporting state. It is 
worthwhile to push States to produce their own indicators if doing so sparks a wider state 
process, that is, quantification is valuable inasmuch as it mobilizes state action. The burden 
rests on States to show that producing disaggregated data does more harm than good. 
Overall the chapter is at once a legal, historical and sociological investigation of the 
Committee’s work, with an eye on the technical nature of realising its mandate. 
 
Chapter 3, Nozipho January-Bardill, ‘Racial Dicrimination and Gender Justice’, 
represents a CERD member discussion of racial discrimination and gender justice, or the link 
between the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and the furtherance of gender 
justice via the UN treaty system. It does not assume a correlation between the standards of 
the treaty and practice of CERD, and the protection and promotion of women’s rights as 
members of groups based on race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin. Indeed, 
specific initiatives in the region of women’s rights which highlighted the intersectional 
nature of discrimination, specifically world conferences on racism and women in Durban 
and Beijing respectively that brought together voices from the NGO and activist community 
as well as professionals, experts and others, have most effectively sought to expose the 
power relations that underpin the continuing marginalization of women’s voices in a range 
of spheres. While CERD initially struggled to identify structural discrimination in a similarly 
effective manner, it has made inroads more recently in aligning itself with identifiable aims 
of gender justice. The chapter highlights the gains made in GR 25, which mainstreams 
gender into all aspects of CERD’s work and marks a breakthrough for the mandatory 
inclusion of gender in the state reporting process including disaggregated data 
requirements. GR 25 further cements a position in the treaty for all women of African 
descent, women from national and ethnic minority groups, Roma women, indigenous and 
migrant women, and women who are non-citizens, among others, with many aspects of the 
gender dimensions of ICERD still to emerge. Significantly, GR 25 also represents a gain for 
women on the Committee itself, including black and other non-white voices, and the 
chapter details some internal struggles in achieving consensus within CERD as to the 
importance of certain initiatives supporting or realizing gender rights. The chapter concludes 
with the author’s shared experience of South Africa and the struggles in moving from a 
society with deep subordinations on the basis of race and gender to a more inclusive one, 
both in law and in fact. 
 
Part II Groups and General Recommendations 
 
Chapter 4, Jeremie Gilbert, ‘CERD's Contribution to the Development of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples under International Law’, reviews CERD’s engagement with and 
contribution to indigenous peoples’ rights under international law. CERD has been at the 
forefront of the development of the rights of indigenous peoples and was the first human 
rights treaty monitoring body to adopt a specific general recommendation on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, GR 23. The chapter focuses on four aspects of CERD’s work on 
indigenous peoples’ rights: tackling structural discrimination; protection of their rights to 
land and territories; ensuring their access to and control over their natural resources; and 
the application of the urgent action and early warning procedures. The question of 
definition is addressed, with many States rejecting CERD’s concern with indigenous peoples. 
In GR 23, CERD affirmed that discrimination against indigenous peoples is racial 
discrimination falling under the scope of the Convention, and its interpretation and 
extension of non-discrimination norms from individual to collective rights, treating 
indigenous peoples as specific category of rights-holders, is innovative. The chapter 
identifies the early warning and urgent action procedures as one of the most relevant 
procedural developments for indigenous peoples, particularly in relation to proposed 
legislation that negatively affects indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 
Chapter 5, Claude Cahn, ‘CERD and Discrimination Against Roma’, provides a 
chronological account of CERD’s engagement with discrimination against Roma and its 
central contribution to developments which have brought about a fundamentally changed 
understanding of the Roma as a heterodox set of ethnic groups. The chapter provides a 
detailed analysis of CERD’s GR 27 on discrimination against Roma. In the years since 2000, 
CERD’s approach to discrimination against Roma has been enriched both by its own 
deepening expertise in the factual matters of Roma exclusion, as well as by the broadening 
nature of civil society interventions, and by the growth of state policies and expertise in this 
area.  COs have become more detailed and concrete, as well as in some cases more bold in 
the expression of discontent with States’ actions. In addition, new issues have emerged in 
the review of States. Also, the Committee has found States in violation of the ICERD treaty 
within the complaints procedure set out under Article 14. Finally, the Committee has 
expanded the geographic range of its concerns on Roma beyond Europe. The chapter 
concludes by noting that CERD has played a key role in moving forward the understanding 
that anti-Romani sentiment is racism and anti-Romani action is racial discrimination in the 
sense of ICERD. 
 
Chapter 6, Annapurna Waughray and David Keane, ‘CERD and Caste-based 
Discrimination’, examines the emergence of the issue of caste-discrimination in 
international human rights law, in particular in the 1990s through application of the descent 
limb in Article 1(1) to caste groups in the context of India’s 1996 state report. It charts the 
emergence of GR 29 (2002) on Article 1(1) (Descent), in which the scope and meaning of 
descent is examined in greater detail, with a definition of descent-based discrimination as 
including caste and analogous systems of inherited status. In addition to examining the 
meaning of caste and the nature of rights violations that occur, the chapter engages with 
State opposition to CERD’s interpretation, in particular from India, which contests the 
categorisation of caste as a form of descent-based discrimination and therefore a form of 
racial discrimination. The chapter illustrates that while the Committee considers the treaty 
to be a living instrument, and may invest meaning in key terms to bring in previously 
marginalised groups such as those based on caste and descent, States parties may not 
accept these interpretations. The chapter outlines the importance of the Committee’s 
pioneering work on caste, and argues that despite the CERD-India stalemate, its crucial work 
on caste will continue given the crucial role of NGOs in the process and the need for a global 
response for victims of caste discrimination. 
 
Chapter 7, Pastor Murillo and Esther Ojulari, ‘CERD General Recommendation 34 - A 
Contribution to the Visibility and Inclusion of Afro-descendants in Latin America’, provides 
an overview of the role of CERD in highlighting and addressing the discrimination suffered 
by Afro-descendants in Latin America, in a combined CERD member-academic piece. It 
examines the history of discourses on race in the region which served to hide the particular 
racial discrimination faced by Afro-descendants. Afro-descendants are a relatively new 
group in terms of human rights protections; it was the UN World Conference on Racism in 
Durban Conference in 2001 which served as a catalyst for the emergence of a framework 
focusing on the rights of Afro-descendants, contributing to both their greater visibility and 
protection. During the Durban Review Conference in 2009, CERD proposed the adoption of 
an international decade on people of African descent.  This led first to the proclamation of 
2011 as the UN International Year for People of African Descent and later to the UN 
International Decade for People of African Descent (2015-2024).  However CERD has been 
engaged with Afro-descendants since the 1980s, using concluding observations and 
recommendations to address issues such as structural discrimination, violence, and the 
importance of collecting statistical data, among others, in relation to Afro-descendants in 
Latin America. CERD GR 34 (2011) on people of African descent is detailed, including its 
potential as a stepping-stone towards an International Declaration on the Rights of Afro-
descendants. 
 
Part III Conflict and Resolution 
 
Chapter 8, William Schabas, ‘Genocide and the ICERD’, investigates CERD’s engagement with 
the subject of genocide.  Although there is no reference to genocide in ICERD, in 1994 CERD 
raised the problem of ethnic violence in response to Rwanda’s periodic report, examined 
just ahead of the outbreak of the genocide in that country and prompting the adoption of a 
Decision expressing concern and alarm over the genocidal loss of life in Rwanda. In 2005 
CERD adopted a Declaration on the Prevention of Genocide, and developed a list of 
indicators relevant to the prevention of genocide, termed ‘indicators of patterns of 
systematic and massive racial discrimination’. Since then, CERD has focussed less on 
genocide specifically, instead referring to genocide in its outputs on other issues. An 
exception was in 2014 when it invoked its Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedures as 
well as its Declaration on Genocide, in relation to Darfur. The chapter asks why the promise 
of much greater attention to genocide by CERD that seemed to emerge in 2005 has not 
been borne out and a number of reasons are suggested. Conclusions are reached on the 
common thread linking ICERD and the Genocide Convention.  
 
Chapter 9, Cathal Doyle, ‘CERD, the State, mining corporations and indigenous 
people’ Rights: The Experience of the Subanon in the Philippines’, offers a compelling case 
study on the operationalization of CERD’s early warning and urgent action procedure in the 
case of the Subanon community located at the foot of Mt Canatuan in the Phillippines, and 
provides a close-up of the relevance of the treaty on the ground. It constructs the events 
and the legal consequences of the infringement of an external mining company on the 
ancestral and sacred lands, and documents the tangle of domestic legal provisions triggered 
as the Subanon community sought to assert its rights in the absence of its free, prior and 
informed consent to the operations. The effectiveness of the CERD procedures form the axle 
of the piece, as it assesses the necessity for international intervention, why CERD became 
the focal point for this, and the positive and negative consequences of the Committee’s 
reactions. It further charts the wider relevance of the community’s triggering of the CERD 
procedures, including the creation of networks that are accessing other mechanisms of 
international human rights law, while not shying from the practical failures to prevent the 
ultimate destruction of the site. The chapter marks both an illustration of the importance of 
CERD in highlighting and actioning critical causes for peoples, and the limits to its remedial 
powers in light of concerted private-public collaboration in subordinating peoples’ rights. It 
ultimately represents a marker of how peoples themselves are contributing to the 
elaboration of the treaty, and that the old CERD-State party model has given way to a 
situation where the groups addressed and protected by the treaty are providing the 
greatest legal analysis of its meaning and reach, often compelled to do so by the critical 
erosion of their rights. 
 
Chapter 10, Lydia Nkansah, ‘ICERD in the Post-Conflict Landscape: Towards a 
Transitional Justice Role’, highlights the potential of ICERD to contribute to the process of 
transitional justice in post-conflict societies. It argues that to date, ICERD has not featured in 
the range of international and national mechanisms that follow conflict often wrought by 
ethnic tensions. The treaty has been triggered in a number of relevant situations, including 
before the ICJ in the Russia-Georgia and DRC-Rwanda cases that involved armed conflict, 
but the opportunity to assert a role for the treaty was not realised. The analysis engages 
with what the best role for ICERD might be, including its potential as a contextual element in 
understanding certain international crimes. In particular it identifies truth commissions as 
having largely ignored the potential for ICERD as a transitional tool, and calls on CERD, 
States Parties and other actors to better understand and carve out a role for ICERD in the 
truth and reconciliation process. Through its potential use in truth commissions and beyond, 
the chapter highlights ICERD’s major potential as a post-conflict, transitional justice tool. It 
offers a vision for the treaty as an important component in rebuilding post-conflict societies, 
arguing that this role has been overlooked in the discussion on CERD and conflict, suggesting 
the potential for a general recommendation in this sphere. 
 
Part IV Present and Future of ICERD  
 
Chapter 11, Joshua Castellino, ‘How Effective has CERD been in Protecting 
Minorities?’, articulates the relationship between the minority rights discourse and ICERD, 
and looks forward to a greater understanding of its relevance to minority rights. The author 
traces the emergence within the UN human rights bodies of a concern with groups and 
group rights to the work of the Committee in carving out its scope and operations. The 
argument is that CERD was pioneering in the process of unravelling the rhetoric of general 
human rights articulated by the emergent United Nations human rights system, setting a 
trend subsequently replicated by later mechanisms and bodies in the need for lex specialis 
regimes to protect specific categories of individuals who are classifiable as members of a 
definitive group. The chapter subsequently engages the work of the Committee in a number 
of areas of importance to minority and indigenous rights. The limits of CERD are also 
understood, in particular as an instrument that was not oriented initially at minorities or 
indigenous peoples and the consequent textual checks on its ability to realise these aims, as 
well as the nature of the process of dialogue undertaken by the Committee. Overall the 
chapter paints ICERD as a key custodian of minority rights within the UN system, a role 
which has been under-represented in the literature. It is expected that in the next years and 
decades, the contribution of CERD to minority rights will become more generally 
understood. 
 
Chapter 12, Tarlach McGonagle, ‘General Recommendation 35 on Combating Racist 
Hate Speech’, outlines how ICERD has traditionally had an outlier status among international 
human rights treaties in respect of racist hate speech due to its heavy reliance on the 
criminalisation of certain types of expression in order to combat racism. The recent GR 35 
(2013) recognises that ICERD as a living instrument must be better synchronised and 
informed by contemporary understandings of racist hate speech, its causes, manifestations 
and impact. The chapter provides an expert assessment of the significance of GR 35, noting 
that it aligns CERD’s approach more closely with those of other international bodies and 
standards. It furthermore removes the treatment of racist hate speech from the relatively 
narrow confines of Article 4 ICERD to a more relational approach engaging a range of 
relevant provisions in the treaty itself, in particular Articles 5 and 7. Hence the chapter 
emphasises the evolution of the Committee’s approach, internally by drawing in a wider 
range of ICERD provisions, and externally by reflecting and growing interpretations from 
other treaty bodies. Since GR 35 is both the latest in a series of general recommendations 
on racist hate speech going back in time, and the most recent of the general 
recommendations, it very much tracks and represents the changing face of the Committee. 
The chapter marks a detailed and thought-provoking analysis of a document that reflects 
the CERD approach today and looking forward. 
 
Chapter 13, ‘Ion Diaconu, ‘ICERD: The Next 50 Years’, closes the collection with the 
views of CERD member Diaconu on the continued and future relevance of ICERD. While 
racism as an official state policy no longer exists, racial discrimination remains a reality, 
taking new forms, and in some cases affecting large segments of the population. The 
constructive dialogue between States parties and CERD has enabled the continued 
application of the treaty to new and emerging situations and to new forms of racial 
discrimination. Thus CERD’s evolving concerns have emerged as a result of its engagement 
with States parties and other bodies, notably NGOs, and a number of areas are highlighted 
as being of particular importance for the future: ensuring the extended application by States 
of the provision on special measures; insisting that policies and practices adopted by States 
for the elimination of racial discrimination include the activities of private actors; the 
dissemination of racist ideas, bearing in mind that CERD has made it clear that 
criminalization of racist should be reserved for the most serious cases; and Article 5 and the 
promotion of the full range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights without 
racial discrimination, focusing in particular on vulnerable groups. The Committee should 
remain alert to new trends and problems, for example the increased significance of cultural 
identities, and in this it will be assisted by developments in other human rights treaty bodies 
and UN organisations. The chapter concludes by noting that while the prohibition of racial 
discrimination will remain as a generally accepted norm of international law, ICERD and the 
system developed around it provide the detail on how the norm is to be realised on the 
ground.  
 
 In a very brief Conclusion, the editors reflect on the growth in the meaning and 
reach of ICERD since 1965. CERD has taken what was perceived to be a narrow mandate on 
apartheid and colonialism and created a near-universal system of innovative protection for 
a wide range of groups. What emerges in the collected writings is that ICERD is a node for 
group rights within the UN human rights system, as well as a technical instrument that 
through its dialogue is acting as a pilot light for States parties to align domestic laws and 
policies towards the equalisation of the enjoyment of the full range of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
